PNGBLOGS

ROWAN CALLICK Plans are under way for the opening of one of the world’s biggest copper and gold mines, with resources worth about $US50 billion, as the China-driven commodities boom keeps rolling on. So far, so predictable, if awesome. But few people expected ever to hear of this vast pit ever again—except those canny investors who hung on to their shares for decades.   It is the Bougainville copper mine in Papua New Guinea, where production was suspended—the owners insist, not closed—on May 15, 1989. Bougainville Copper Ltd—which is 53.58 percent owned by British-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto Ltd, 19.06 percent by the Papua New Guinea Government, and 27.36 percent by other shareholders—believes it will cost about $US3 billion to reopen the mine.   The vast trucks and electricity pylons may have been blown up or rusted or cannibalised, but the resources in the mine have not, of course, been damaged or diminished over the last 21 years. It contains 3.5 million tonnes o

ROWAN CALLICK Plans are under way for the opening of one of the world’s biggest copper and gold mines, with resources worth about $US50 billion, as the China-driven commodities boom keeps rolling on. So far, so predictable, if awesome. But few people expected ever to hear of this vast pit ever again—except those canny investors who hung on to their shares for decades.   It is the Bougainville copper mine in Papua New Guinea, where production was suspended—the owners insist, not closed—on May 15, 1989. Bougainville Copper Ltd—which is 53.58 percent owned by British-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto Ltd, 19.06 percent by the Papua New Guinea Government, and 27.36 percent by other shareholders—believes it will cost about $US3 billion to reopen the mine.   The vast trucks and electricity pylons may have been blown up or rusted or cannibalised, but the resources in the mine have not, of course, been damaged or diminished over the last 21 years. It contains 3.5 million ton

Rowan Callick The Australian THE Bougainville mine's development was fast-tracked by the Australian government. This occured when pressure built at the UN for Canberra to grant early independence to Papua New Guinea. The mine was intended to provide the new nation with solid income in addition to aid. In the 17 years from 1972 to 1989, it contributed about 44 per cent of PNG's exports, about 17 per cent of the government's revenue, and 10 per cent of PNG's gross domestic product. It employed 2800 people. The mine had been built by Rio Tinto in the face of landowner opposition. Women -- through whom land in much of Bougainville is inherited -- lay down in front of bulldozers. It took until 1980 for the original compensation package to be signed with 600 families. PNG's decentralisation to 20 provincial governments resulted from Bougainville's threat to pull of PNG in 1976, a fortnight before Australia was due to declare it independent -- threatening to rob the ne

Rowan Callick The Australian THE Bougainville mine's development was fast-tracked by the Australian government. This occured when pressure built at the UN for Canberra to grant early independence to Papua New Guinea. The mine was intended to provide the new nation with solid income in addition to aid. In the 17 years from 1972 to 1989, it contributed about 44 per cent of PNG's exports, about 17 per cent of the government's revenue, and 10 per cent of PNG's gross domestic product. It employed 2800 people. The mine had been built by Rio Tinto in the face of landowner opposition. Women -- through whom land in much of Bougainville is inherited -- lay down in front of bulldozers. It took until 1980 for the original compensation package to be signed with 600 families. PNG's decentralisation to 20 provincial governments resulted from Bougainville's threat to pull of PNG in 1976, a fortnight before Australia was due to declare it independent -- threatening to ro

OP/ED The Bougainville crisis did not just happen. The writing, so to speak, was on the wall for a good seven years before violence erupted. Even in the early days of the crisis, the prolonged and bloody nature of it could have been averted, but it was not. The reason for this was really a series of stupid decisions and unforgivable neglect by those in authority at the time in national government and the Bougainville Copper Ltd. The Bougainville Copper Agreement, signed in 1974, had contained within it a provision for a review to occur every seven years. The first opportunity for such a review fell in 1981, but there was no review. Angry reminders were made in the media, and even in parliament, by the member for Bougainville, John Momis. The crisis started when the second opportunity for a review, 14 years from the signing of the BCA, fell due in 1988 and it looked like nobody was prepared to do it. When the power pylons were felled, Panguna leaders sought the way of peace but, while

OP/ED The Bougainville crisis did not just happen. The writing, so to speak, was on the wall for a good seven years before violence erupted. Even in the early days of the crisis, the prolonged and bloody nature of it could have been averted, but it was not. The reason for this was really a series of stupid decisions and unforgivable neglect by those in authority at the time in national government and the Bougainville Copper Ltd. The Bougainville Copper Agreement, signed in 1974, had contained within it a provision for a review to occur every seven years. The first opportunity for such a review fell in 1981, but there was no review. Angry reminders were made in the media, and even in parliament, by the member for Bougainville, John Momis. The crisis started when the second opportunity for a review, 14 years from the signing of the BCA, fell due in 1988 and it looked like nobody was prepared to do it. When the power pylons were felled, Panguna leaders sought the way of peace but, whi